or conspicuous event that appeared relatively late in the causal chain leading to Y (e.g. , Cohn, 2000; da Silva, Duck, & Catarino, 2004; Sydora, Tavernini, Wessler, Jewell, & Fedorak, 2003) .
The concept seems to serve its purpose in many fields of science. It is used in a pragmatic fashion, to indicate where a cause of particular interest is to be found. In most domains, there is probably no need for a more stringent definition, because no important discussion turns on the exact definition of "initiating cause."
In the field of behavior analysis, the situation is somewhat different. Within this school of thought, there is broad agreement that one class of events has the potential to be full and real causes. When such events cause behavior, they are called "initiating causes. " A second class of events is not allowed the same potential. At most, members of this class can be given the status of intermediate causes, (e.g. , Catania, 1988 Catania, , 1998 Flora & Kestner, 1995; Pierce & Cheney, 2004; Skinner, 1987 Skinner, , 1988 . The two classes of events are said not to be very different. Acco rding to behavior analysts, they "have the same kinds of physical dimensions" (Skinner, 1963, p. 953) .
The first class of events includes almost everything that may reasonably be called a stimulus, and is often refe rred to as public events, external events, or events taking place in the environment. The second class consists of phenomena that have traditionally been of interest to psychologists, primarily thinking and feelings. This class tends to go by the name of "private events." That two types of events said to have the same physical dimensions still differ regarding their ability to function as causes is an assumption not based on empirical research. Instead, as we shall see, the assumption seems based primarily on the fact that private events have been difficult to observe and manipulate. Indeed, behavior analysts define "private behavior" as "behavior that is only accessible to the person who emits it" (Pierce & Cheney, 2004, p. 439) and "private events" in the following way: "in verbal behavior, events accessible only to the speaker (usually, events inside the skin)" (Catania, 1998, p. 403) .
Identity
Private events are categorized as behaviors . Though it seems clear that a behavior can cause other behavior (e.g ., Catania, 1998; Hixson, 2004; Premack, 1962) , this causative potential is nonetheless accorded only to behaviors that can be more easily observed and manipulated than those known as private events.
I have argued (Overskeid , 1994) that drawing a clear line between intermediate and initiating causes of behavior is difficult, especially if the dividing line is assumed to coincide with the private/public distinction. Some behaviorists seem to have held similar views. More than 80 years ago, Tolman (1922 , p. 48 ) saw external as well as private stimuli (such as remembering something) as potential causes of behavior, taking care to define memory not in mental but in physiological terms, as "the neurological end-result of a preceding activity." B. F. Skinner argued that an organism's bHhavior always involves the whole organism-observable and less observable parts do not act separately. Skinner affirms (1963, p. 953) : "The skin is not that important as a boundary. Private and public events have the same kinds of physical dimensions," concluding (1975, p. 44 ) that "it is the organism as a whole that behaves." Catania (1998) and Parrott (1983) , among others, support this view. Indeed, in the words of Delprato and Midgley (1992, p. 1512) : "Private events refer to 'real' events, and their ontological status is identical to that of any other aspect of the physical world."
Strictly speaking, if the status of a private event is identical to that of other events in the physical world, it follows as a matter of logic that the private event can potentially cause behavior in exactly the same way as any other event in the world. Because two things that are identical cannot at the same time be different, it seems theoretically inconsistent to claim that a private event, as opposed to other events, is unthinkable in principle as a cause of behavior. It would be easier to understand if studying and manipulating private events were said to be too difficult and not practically feasible. But this does not seem to be the main argument. As we saw above, Skinner and others have argued that private events can never be causes in the complete sense ascribed to public stimuli-they cannot be initiating causes.
What Is an Initiating Cause? Though not infrequently used in behavior analysis, the term "initiating cause" seems not to have been defined before Flora and Kestner's (1995) explication, which remains the only behavior analytiC attempt to state the meaning of the term. The explication comprises three criteria.
The first criterion that must be satisfied for causes to be called "initiating ," is this: "Proof of their causal status rests on more than the existence of the behavior it supposedly causes" (Flora & Kestner, 1995, p. 577) . Though one tends to avoid speaking of "proof" in empirical sciences (e.g ., Woodward & Goodstein, 1996) , Flora and Kestner's first criterion undoubtedly expresses a truth. It is a very general truth, however, which follows from the fact that one cannot deduce the cause of X from simply observing that X exists. Hence no kind of cause, whether it be called initiating or intermediate, can be identified merely by observing the occurrence of a certain behavior. Flora and Kestner's first criterion does not seem well suited, then, for discriminating between initiating causes and other causes.
According to Flora and Kestner (1995, p. 578) , the second criterion to be satisfied is the following: "Another known cause does not exist." This criterion is problematic for several reasons. First of all, it means that as long as one cause of Y is the only one known, that cause may be neither necessary nor sufficient for Y to occur, and perhaps far removed in time, and still be regarded as an initiating cause. This seems unreasonable.
More importantly, however, the second criterion would seem to rule out the presentation of a reinforcer as an initiating cause of behavior. To use a very simple example: If a rat's lever pressing is reinforced by access to water, is the fact that lever pressing results in water delivery the only known cause of its behavior? Or is it also a known cause that the rat has been deprived of water for a certain period of time? According to Flora and Kestner (1995) , if another known cause exists, the reinforcing event cannot be an initiating cause.
Several authors have pointed out that responding is never strengthened simply by the presentation of a reinforcer (e.g., Bijou & Baer, 1961; Michael, 1982) . In the words of Timberlake (1993, p. 105) : "Reinforcement is better viewed as the outcome of constraint of a functioning causal system comprised of multiple interrelated causal sequences, complex linkages between causes and effects, and a set of initial conditions." Hayes and Brownstein (1986) point out that a behavioral analytic explanation is always the "act in context." "Context," say Hayes and Brownstein (1986, p. 178) , "can proceed backward in time infinitely ... , or forward in time to include the most delayed consequence." The amount of context we need to analyze is determined, they point out, by what is necessary to achieve prediction and control.
The third criterion of an initiating cause of behavior, as formulated by Flora and Kestner (1995, p. 578) , reads as follows: "The event exists outside of the system that is to be explained as a force acting upon it." However, if reinforcement is an event taking place within a causal system resembling that described by authors like Hayes and Brownstein (1986) or Timberlake (1993) , the third criterion, too, seems to rule out the presentation of a reinforcer as an initiating cause-though one may doubt whether this was Flora and Kestner's intention. It thus seems we must conclude that the behavior analytic meaning of "initiating cause" still is not entirely clear and unambiguous.
Prediction and Control
In the 1960s and early '70s, several authors began reporting results from operant experimentation with humans that deviated from what was to be expected, according to the animal literature (e.g ., Ayllon & Azrin, 1964; Laties & Weiss, 1963; Weiner, 1970) . In a peculiar way, people seemed insensitive to consequences of responding, and many authors were at a loss when trying to explain why (e.g., Ader & Tatum, 1961; Weiner, 1962 Weiner, , 1964 . Some researchers (e.g., Long, Hammack, May, & Campbell, 1958) insisted that their deviant data from humans nonetheless fit into the picture described by Ferster and Skinner (1957) , based on animal responding. Others, however, acknowledged the difference and wanted explanations. Among the first to do so within a behaviorist tradition were Lovaas (1961 Lovaas ( , 1964 , Laties and Weiss (1963) , and Ayllon and Azrin (1964) , who regarded an analysis of the interaction between verbal and nonverbal behavior as the primary clue to understanding the peculiarities of human responding.
In the early 1970s, harbingers of the modern literature on rulegoverned versus contingency-shaped behavior started to appear (e.g., Hildebrandt, Feldman, & Ditrichs, 1973) : It was not until the latter half of the '70s, however, that Skinner's ideas on two fundamentally different forms of operant behavior in humans (Skinner, 1969 (Skinner, , 1974 (Skinner, , 1984 were taken seriously as a starting point for empirical research (e.g., Lowe, Harzem, & Hughes, 1978; Matthews, Shimoff, Catania, & SaQlvolden, 1977) .
What seems clear today is that people's vl erbal rules often make them insensitive to contingencies of reinforcement (cf. Hayes, 1989; Navarick, 2004 . See Bizo & Sweeney, 2005 , however, for an illustration of how instructions may sometimes facilitate sensitivity to contingencies in humans). The extreme example of rule-governed insensitivity is martyrdom-choosing to suffer or die in order to continue following a rule, often of a political or religious nature.
"Rule-governed insensitivity to contingencies" is a way of characterizing activity said to be under the control of verbal behavior that is often private and called a rule. Rule-governed behavior is itself assumed to be operant behavior, and there is some empirical support for this assumption (e.g ., Svartdal , 1991) . The tendency to follow rules may thus very well result from observable reinforcement of rule-following bl9havior.
Let us say, however, that we want to predict and control a behavior that is assumed to be rule-governed. Let us assume that Mrs. A is a mother who believes the dictum "spare the rod and spoil the child." Thence she has derived a rule to the effect that for her children to lead good lives, she must punish bad behavior severely. Her children react to the punishment with anger and sadness, and Mrs. A is sensitive to her children's responses in the sense that it hurts her to see them sad and angry. It has also upset Mrs. A that her husband has scolded her for being too harsh on the kids. Mrs. A continues her strict mode of upbringing, however. Her rule-governed behavior has, it seems reasonable to conclude, become insensitive to consequences that are often aversive.
How to predict Mrs. A's behavior? She might react very differently to behaviors that are topographically identical, given that she has chosen to follow a function-altering rule (cf. Schlinger & Blakl3ly, 1987) . For instance, Mrs. A may praise her children for darning their socks on most days, but scold them if they do so on a Sunday, because her function-altering rule states that working on the Lord's day is a sin. Asking Mrs. A why she scolds her kids on Sundays, and employing the working hypothesis that her behavior is rule-governed, seems an efficient way of predicting when she will praise and when she will condemn sock: mending behavior. No doubt, most applied behavior analysts would choose this strategy, instead of searching for stimuli in the external environml3nt that might occasion scolding (though they might come across a calendar) . In hypothesizing that Mrs. A's behavior is rule-governed, one is, however, basing one's prediction on the assumed existence of a private event.
Rules result, of course, from interaction with the environment. Realizing this is of little practical help, however, when it comes to making predictions. In dealing with normally functioning humans, assuming behavior to be governed by private verbal behavi ior will often lead to the most successful predictions.
It is of course possible to control Mrs. A's behavior without assuming it to be governed by private events. One can, for instance, subject her to aversive stimulation each time she responds to her children in an undesired way. Whether this will work is uncertain, however, as we have already seen that her behavior is unaffected by her children's reactions, which are consequences she finds hurtful. A verbal threat might be more effective: "If I see you doing that again, I will ... " Better still could be an attempt to change Mrs. A's rules by engaging her in conversation with a person of relevant, perhaps religious, authority, who might convince her that there are better ways of bringing up children. This is not a recipe for changing people's child-rearing behavior. The important point is, however, that we sometimes assume humans' overt behavior to be under the control of private verbal behavior, because that assumption leads to the most effective way of manipulating the behavior in question. When this is the case, we are not denying that rules depend on an environment to be formulated, and the fact remains that private verbal behavior is difficult to observe.
A rule will often be a conspicuous event that appears relatively late in the causal chain leading to certain behavior. When this is the case, a rule is an initiating cause, in the sense applied in other sciences (see e.g., Cohn, 2000; da Silva et aI., 2004; Sydora et aI., 2003) . If the rule has been formulated by the person behaving, it may only be conspicuous to him or her. This should not be a problem for behavior analysts, however. According to Skinner (1945, p. 293) : "The ultimate criterion for the goodness of a concept is not whether two people are brought into agreement but whether the scientist who uses the concept can operate successfully upon his material --all by himself if need be." Indeed, "a proposition is 'true' to the extent that with its help the listener responds effectively to the situation it describes" (Skinner, 1974, p. 235) .
Behavior analysts thus see concepts and propositions as good and true, not necessarily when people agree that they are, but when they help a person operate successfully. In science, behavior analysts maintain that the criterion for successful operation is whether one is getting closer to the goals of prediction and control, which they see as the primary goals of science (see e.g., Delprato & Midgley, 1992; Hayes & Brownstein, 1986) . Based on these premises, it seems strange that most behavior analysts are unwilling to entertain the hypothesis that private events can be as full and complete causes of behavior as events that are easier to observe and manipulate. I propose that private events can cause behavior in the same sense as any other event can. If that proposition can help me in achieving the goals of prediction and control, it is, according to Skinner, a true proposition.
What is needed, then, is to show that assuming behavior to be controlled by a private event will sometimes lead to better predictions and more effective control than will alternative approaches. We shall go further into that question. Explanations Pierce and Cheney (2004, pp. 19-20) write:
In the cognitive view, thoughts are used to explain behavior. The problem is that the existence of thoughts (or feelings) is often inferred from the behavior to be explained, leading to circular reasoning . For example, a child who peers out the window about the time his or her mother usually comes home from work is said to do this because of an expectation . The expectation of the child is said to explain why the child peers from the window. In fact, there is no explanation, because the cognition (expectation) is inferred from the behavior it is said to explain.
With no reference to the literature, it is unclear what Pierce and Cheney (2004, pp. 19-20) mean by "the cognitive view." Let us therefore look for a moment at an illustration of how expectation has been used to explain findings in the cognitive tradition. A study by Chapman (1971, see also Chapman & Chapman, 1969) has been called a classic (ct. Reisberg, 2001 ) and is about illusory correlations. Chapman and Chapman (1971) asked college students to study a number of fictional transcripts of people's responses to Rorschach inkblots. The transcripts, known as protocols, were attributed either to a paranoid or a gay person. The protocols and personality descriptions were randomly paired, and were shown to a group of undergraduates who had no prior experience with the Rorschach test. The students were asked to figure out which signs covaried with homosexuality. They reported that homosexual respondents were particularly likely to perceive buttocks in the inkblots. There was no such pattern in the transcripts, however. Hence reporting a covariation between seeing buttocks and being gay was attributed to the students' expectation.
The observable cause of the students' behavior was of course the independent variable of the experiment. When told that a protocol came from a gay person, students reported that there! were more "buttocks" responses. Hence the finding could be accounted for with something Pierce and Cheney (2004) would probably accept as a genuine explanation: The observed relation between a stimulus (the false information regarding the protocol) and a later response (the students' report). Few scientists would find this explanation satisfactory, however. They would want to ask why the stimulus occasioned this specific response. Pierce and Cheney would ·probably answer that question by appealing to the contingencies of reinforcement that shaped the students' relevant behavior. No doubt those contingencies are important. If prediction and control are one's goals, however, it seems the first question to ask should be whether attempting to map the contingencies is the most efficient way of achieving those goals.
By growing up in a certain culture, people onen learn to hold certain assumptions about specific groups, such as homosexuals. It seems a parsimonious hypothesis that such assumptions may exist in the form of private verbal behavior, and that private verbalizations may have governed the behavior of students judging the Rorschach data. If this was indeed the case, then according to the criteria applied in other sciences, discussed above, the private verbal behavior of the students would probably be classified as an initiating cause. More importantly, however, there is reason to believe that assuming the behavior of the Rorschachclassifying participants to be governed by an expectation in the form of private verbal behavior would greatly aid attempts to predict and control their behavior. New studies keep appearing of illusory correlations like those we have just discussed (see e.g., Madey & Chasteen, 2004) .
Cognitive therapists trying to help sad or anxious people concentrate on a hypothesized initiating cause of behavior: What a patient is thinking when he or she experiences uncomfortable feelings (e.g., Overskeid, 2004) . By aiming to change thinking, cognitive therapy has arguably become more successful in controlling neurotic behavior than any of its competitors (see Chambless & Ollendick, 2001; Wilhelmsen, 2004) .
When cognitivists and behaviorists attack the same problems, their relevant assumptions tend to become quite similar (Overskeid, 1995) . This also seems to happen in the field of psychological therapy. Like cognitive therapists, Hayes, a behavior analyst, and his associates, assume that "psychological pain cannot be avoided purely by avoiding external situations. Humans thus begin to target negatively evaluated private events per se as the focus of avoidance" (Hayes et aI., 2004, p. 555) . Private events may thus cause escape or avoidance behavior, and, according to Hayes et al. (2004, p. 554) , a person may take steps "to alter the form or frequency of these experiences or the contexts that occasion them, even when these forms of avoidance cause behavioral harm." It seems, in other words, that Hayes et al. assume certain private events to be pretty strong causes-inner, unobservable causes that exert their effect even when they lead to "behavioral harm."
One can never be sure that the patients' thinking is indeed the cause of their problems. Still being guided by that assumption has enabled therapists to do something about the feelings that bother their patients. Empirical knowledge is always uncertain to some extent. Nevertheless, the important question is not whether we know the absolute truth, which may not be knowable. It seems the important question will always be, in the words of Skinner (1945, p. 293) , whether one "is getting anywhere" with one's control over nature.
Let us still examine a little closer the situation described by Pierce and Cheney (2004, pp. 19-20) . They depict a child whose peering behavior appears to be an operant maintained by an interval schedule of reinforcement. If the mother comes home from work at the same time every day, this would be a fixed interval 24-hour schedule, with a limited hold (LH), because the mother would be visible only for a finite period of time. In other words, peering out the window may be reinforced every 24 hours by visual contact with the mother.
It is uncontroversial among behavior analysts that humans exposed to schedules of reinforcement may construct rules attempting to describe the contingencies (Catania, 1998; Rosenfarb, Newland, Brannon, & Howey, 1992) . In the words of Skinner (1969, p. 147) : "We refer to behavior under the control of prior contingency-specifying stimuli when we say that an organism behaves in a given way because it expects a similar consequence to follow in the future" (italics in ori!~inal). It seems likely that the peering child has constructed a contingencyspecifying stimulus in the form of rule saying "If I look out the window at 5.30, I can see mother coming home." Catania (1998, p. 268 ) speaks of such rules as "assumptions." "The cognitive view," as described by Pierce and Cheney (2004, p. 19) , uses the word "expectation ."
Accord ing to Catania (1998, p. 268) , "sometimes our assumptions . . . make our behavior insensitive to some of the contingencies." The assumptions are thus assumed to function as stimuli that govern behavior. It is difficult to see why an explanation in terms of assumptions is apparently valid, while using the term "expectation" is not. Furthermore, if hypothesizing that assumptions or expectations are initiating causes of behavior will improve upon our ability to predict and control, it is also difficult to see why an assumption or expectation-in other words a rule like the one used to explain the peering behavior-cannot be called an initiating cause of behavior.
Thinking
In empirical sciences, the assumption that X causes Y is of course, strictly speaking, always a hypothesis. Let us say that a researcher has weighed the evidence and concluded that private verbal behavior is the most likely cause of a certain behavior-for instance, the behavior of a scientist formulating a novel theory. If this were the case, it seems apparent that the private behavior would satisfy the criteria often applied when "initiating cause" is used in other sciences: The assumption would be that the private verbalization in question was a somewhat unusual or conspicuous event that appeared relatively late in the causal chain leading to the formulation of the theory. As we have seen, the behavior analytic conception of "truth" is such that no one should havl9 a problem with the fact that a private verbalization is most often conspicuous to the behaver only.
Though interaction with the environment is of course important in shaping and developing a scientist's behavior, it seems impractical to try to identify the specific environmental variables that occasioned his or her private verbal behavior-and perhaps impossible to manipulate them. There are indications, for instance, that important environmental determinants may have exerted their effect in a creative person's childhood . Experiences that help weaken the constraints imposed by conventional socialization are one example (see Simonton, 2000) . Furthermore , environmental events do not shape a scientist's behavior all by themselves. Genetic makeup, as well as age and other factors , are probably also contributing to the type of private verbal behavior that is important in theoretical work (Simonton, 1988 (Simonton, , 2000 .
We should remember that science is all about practicality, in the sense of making our goals as easy to reach as possible. It may be achievable, at least in principle, to explain behavior entirely in terms of physics. We do not attempt to do that, however, because an explanation at that level would be very impractical. We would not know what to do with it, it would hardly leave us any closer to our goals. What we want are explanations on a level that makes reaching our primary goals as straightforward as possible.
A competent general will not attempt to reach tactical goals that are deemed to conflict with the main goal of winning the war. Upholding the doctrine of two types of causes whose ontological statuses are "identical," but that are yet unequal, may seem to be a tactical objective that impedes progress towards the ultimate goals of prediction and control. To the extent that prediction and control of behavior can most easily be achieved by assuming private events to be potential initiating causes, it seems wise to make that assumption.
A Conflict Our discussion thus far has indicated that a conflict may exist between two tenets of behavior analysis: (a) Private events cannot be initiating causes of behavior, and (b) the goal of behavior analysis is prediction and control.
. From the discussion it seems the question of what deserves to be called an initiating cause is in many ways a dead end and an issue that cannot be settled empirically. The main problem, of course, is that even in an uncomplicated environment, there are many causes sine qua non behind a given behavior (ct. Michael, Hixson, & Clark, 1997; Timberlake, 1993) . Hence defining "initiating cause" will always be a matter of what seems reasonable to the person defining the concept, and people do not always agree as to what is reasonable. Indeed, agreement on the meaning of the term may not even be worth seeking. In the words of Skinner (1945, p. 293 
):
Whole-hearted agreement on the definition of psychological terms makes for contentment but not for progress . . .. What matters to Robinson Crusoe is not whether he is agreeing with himself but whether he is getting anywhere with his control over nature.
On the one hand, behavior analysts emphasize that there is no physical difference between stimuli in an organism's internal milieu and those appearing in the external environment (e.g., Delprato & Midgley, 1992; Skinner, 1963) . In spite of this, and though the rationale for doing so may be neither crystal-clear nor consistently applied, private events have been singled out by behavior analysts as being second-rate stimuli, in the sense that they cannot be full and real causes of behavior. This appears problematic, because an explanation seems to be lacking as to why internal stimuli , whose status is said to be "identical to that of any other aspect of the physical world" (Delprato & Midgley, 1992 , p. 1512 , are still assumed to lack the capacity to cause behavior in the same full sense as stimuli that can be more easily observed.
Because behavior analysis is focused on prediction and control, a doctrine stating that some stimuli have less causal potential than others is likely to direct interest away from such stimuli, as regards both research and application. This is what seems to have happened -behavior analysts have concentrated much more on how behavior is affected by stimuli that are easily observed than by those more difficult to detect. This may be part of the answer why most behavior analysts are not doing research in important areas like thinkin!~ and decision making. Furthermore, it has been said that there are pmssing problems in the world having to do, among other things, with the way people feel about events (e.g., Skinner, 1986) . Still, with very few exceptions, feelings and their relation to behavior are also a domain in which behavior analytic research activity is low.
There can be little doubt, however, that the exltent to which a stimulus can cause behavior in an organism is an empirical question. By directing attention and interest away from private events one deprives oneself of the possibility of mapping the potential of such events as regards prediction and control of behavior. This should be some cause for concern, as the doctrine of "identical but unequal" regarding the causal potential of easily vs. less easily observable events seems to be lacking in empirical support.
There is, on the other hand, data available that may support a view of private events as causes equally important and powerful as those more easily observable. Indeed, hypothesizing that important causes of behavior are within the skin sometimes seems the tactic most likely to increase predictive ability and control of behavior. We discussed cognitive therapy and several other examples above. Let us now turn to some additional illustrations.
Thinking and Controlling
Now and then I play computer games. In the course of playing a game, I sometimes form an intention to hit a key on my keyboard, and then proceed to hit it, in order to make an object move on the screen. Some might say that when the object moves, the cause behind my receiving this reinforcing stimulation was my intention of moving it. Most behavior analysts would maintain that the initiatin~J cause of my behavior could be found in the environment, not in the private event of thinking.
What, then, if by thinking certain thoughts, I could learn to manipulate the movement of the object directly, without any intervening variable in the form of overt behavior? Several authors have shown that this can be done. For instance, people have been taught to playa computer version of table tennis simply by lying still in a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) machine and thinking (see Peplow, 2004) . After a short period of training, participants became quite adept at moving a bat upwards by thinking certain thoughts and using other thoughts to move it down. The most proficient individuals learned to successfully return four out of five balls, though their strategies varied. For instance, one participant, a musician, says he imagined the various sights and sounds of a concert, and used some images to move the bat up, while other images would move it down (Peplow, 2004) . Wolpaw and McFarland (2004) went a step further. By registering the brain's electrical activity, they taught participants wearing electrode-laden caps to move cursors on screens in many directions, not just up or down. Again, participants used whatever kind of imagery they could. Wolpaw and his colleagues are now working on devices that they hope will make paraplegics able to control a robot arm simply by thinking. It has already been shown that monkeys with electrodes implanted into their brains can use brain signals to move a virtual robotic arm (Helms Tillery, Taylor, & Schwartz, 2003) .
In the examples above, there is no doubt that external stimuli are important in causing people to think in certain ways. People think about the world and change it. Their thinking is in turn changed by the consequences provided by the external world. The probability of some types of thinking increases, because it increases the probability of certain consequences. In these experiments, thinking seems, in other words, to be operant behavior, which is hardly surprising to a behavior analyst.
Still the fact is worth considering that without being guided by the assumption that a thought can be a cause in the full sense accorded to stimuli outside the skin, it seems unlikely that machines controlled by thinking would have been developed. As we have seen, behavior analysts typically turn to external consequences to explain behavior, not to thinking. Behavior analysts are not taking part in developing theoretically interesting and practically useful phenomena like cognitive therapy or thought-controlled machines-in part, I would argue, because they do not look to thinking as a real cause of observable activity and hence miss important ways of predicting and controlling behavior. Even arguing that some private events should be studied, without invoking them as initiating causes (Friman, Hayes, & Wilson, 1998) has drawn criticism from the camp of orthodox behavior analysis (Lamal, 1998) .
Though modern brain imaging may be changing the situation, the behavior of thinking is less conspicuous than that of consuming a pellet, for instance. But why is this important? Most, if not all, other sciences make use of hypothetical constructs, and, as we have seen, the basic behaviorist attitude is that what matters is whether one "is getting anywhere" with one's control over nature.
Reliability and Cognitive Psychology
Behavior analysts often claim that reports of private events are not sufficiently reliable to be regarded as scientific observations. A case in point is Pierce and Cheney (2004, p. 21) . They state that "reports of feelings are highly unreliable" and explain why this is so. Pierce and Cheney (p. 21) go on to conclude that "we are able to report in a limited way on private events, but the unreliability of such reports make them questionable as scientific observations. Based on this realization, behavior analysts focus on the study of behavior." Unfortunately, when Pierce and Cheney (2004) make their claims and assumptions regarding the reliability of reports of private events, they do so without a single reference to the scientific literature. A substantial literature exists, however, dealing with the reliability of scales and tests said to measure private events. For instance, the reliability of instruments claiming to measure phenomena such as fatigue, satisfaction, and depression has been shown to sometimes be very high, and frequently high enough to be considered useful (e.g., Lingja1erde & Foreland, 1998; Morgan, Halpern, & Lo, 1999; Wolfe, 2004) . Furthermore, even if reports of private events were not very reliable, this is not necessarily a reason to disregard such information. If there is important information to be gained, even sources whose reliability is limited may be worth taking into account. For instance, though predicting earthquakes is difficult, we might still want to listen to a geologist claiming that a big one is coming soon.
Reports of internal events are unreliable, say Pierce and Cheney (2004) , because training of correspondence between public conditions and private events is less than perfect. Still, I (and I believe most other people) find that we are able to make close to perf8!ctly reliable reports and predictions based exclusively on information from private events. Private events sometimes tell us that we will now be able to eat a lot and at other times that eating will be well nigh impossible. SutCh predictions are very reliable. A private event tells us we need to visit the lavatory, going there tends to confirm the accuracy of the prediction. Aifter a trip abroad I may long for my girlfriend. The private event of 10ngin~1 enables me to predict with high reliability that on seeing her I will smile, hug her, kiss her, etc. If, however, I feel irritable when we meet, I can very reliably predict that I will not hug or kiss her. The list could go on. It already seems clear, however, that most people know from their own experience that many private events can form the basis for very reliable reports and predictions.
Furthermore, the examples just mentioned again illustrate how private events may be important causes of observable behavior. Some private events make me eat or drink. Again, of course, my appetite is affected by the time that has passed since my last meal. However, illness, stress, depression, and whether or not I happen to like the food available are also among other things that may affect my appetite. In most people, the extent to which one feels hungry is important in determining when and how much one eats. Similar arguments can be made in favor of the causal importance of the urge to go to the bathroom, longling for another person, and many other private events.
If treating all physical events as equals, in thIS sense of ascribing to them the same causal potential, will lead to more atCcurate predictions and more efficient control, it seems this is what behavior analysts should do. A tactic of scientific research has no value in and of itself, only insofar as it is an efficient way of reaching the research goal. In practice, changing this tactic may be a less radical step than it sounds like. There is no doubt that radical behaviorism admits to the existence of numerous private events as intervening variables (see Overskeid, 1994; Zuriff, 1979) ; one just shrinks from calling these events initiating causes of behavior.
Like behavior analysts, cognitive psychologists believe behavior to be lawful, and no cognitive theory ascribes any role to "free will." There may in fact be few, if any, differences between a Skinnerian and a mainstream cognitive view of causality. Both positions share a pragmatic point of departure, and though behavior analysts emphasize control more than do cognitivists, they share with cognitive psychologists the view that prediction is important (e.g., Nichols, Stich, Leslie, & Klein, 1996; Sternberg, 2003) . To achieve this goal, both schools of thought accept that independent variables may reside inside the organism.
Furthermore, though few cognitivists have acquainted themselves with Skinner's theories of cognition, his operant analysis of problem solving has been lauded by a prominent cognitive psychologist who has (Hunt, 1984) . This could be the start of a long discussion, but suffice it to say that a fundamental difference between admissible concepts in behavior analysis and cognitive psychology is not as obvious as one might think. Overskeid (1995) delves deeper into the question of whether important differences really exist where behavior analysts and cognitive psychologists study the same phenomenon.
Conclusions
Behavior analysts assume that public and private events have the same kinds of physical dimensions (Skinner, 1975) . Indeed, the ontological status of private events is assumed to be identical to that of any other aspect of the physical world (Delprato & Midgley, 1992) . Behavior analysts still speak of two types of causes, those that are initiating, and those that are not. The latter class consists of private events such as thinking and feeling. Such events are supposedly never initiating causes of behavior (Flora & Kestner, 1995) . However, because two things that are identical cannot at the same time be different, it seems theoretically inconsistent, I have argued, to claim that a private event, as opposed to other events, is unthinkable in principle as a cause of behavior.
From the discussion in the present paper it seems the question of what deserves to be called an initiating cause is in many ways a dead end, and an issue that cannot be settled empirically. The main problem, of course, is that even in an uncomplicated environment, there are many causes sine qua non behind a given behavior (ct. Michael et aI., 1997; Timberlake, 1993) . Hence defining "initiating cause" will always be a matter of what seems reasonable to the person defining the concept, and people do not always agree as to what is reasonable. Indeed, agreement on the meaning of the term may not even be worth seeking. Behavior analysts have always been more interested in terms and concepts that work, in the sense of increasing the probability of prediction and control, than in agreement on definitions (Skinner, 1945) .
In line with its pragmatic basis, behavior analysis sees propositions as true, not because people agree that they are, but to the extent that they help a person operate successfully (Skinner, 1974) . I may propose that private events can sometimes be as strong and important causes as external events. If that proposition can more efficiently help me predict and control behavior than a hypothesis that only allows external events the status of complete causes, my proposition should be regarded as truer than its competitor.
I have argued that the practice of focusing almost exclusively on external causes may lead to less than optimal results in the effort towards improved prediction and control of behavior. It s, eems the probability of successful prediction and control can be increased by entertaining the hypothesis that in a causal sequence, private events may sometimes be important causal events that can be manipulated to change external behavior. Among other things, the present paper's discussion of issues, such as rule-governed behavior, cognitive therapll, thinking, expectation, and direct control of computers by thinking, supports this assumption.
It thus appears that a conflict exists between prediction and control , as the primary goals of behavior analysis, and the practice of distinguishing between initiating and noninitiating causes. Choosing between the two should be easy. By discarding the division between causes that can and cannot be initiating, behavior analysis should be even better equipped to make its unique and important contribution towards increased understanding of the behavior of organisms.
